Political reconciliation has happened between Northern Ireland voters. How can we make reconciliation happen between mutually-exclusive party narratives?

An Taoiseach, Mícheál Martin, recently asked “can we share this piece of ground together in a harmonious way that involves real sustainable peace and friendliness for generations to come?”¹ The answer is a resounding yes, according to recent surveys.

Recent ARINS surveys asked Northerners their opinion on either remaining in the United Kingdom or reunifying with the South. Some 95 per cent of Catholics are reconciled to remaining (either ‘not happy, but could live with it’ or ‘happily accept’). For Protestants (also 2024), 77 per cent of Protestants are reconciled to living in a united Ireland². In the 2023 survey, 96 per cent of Others were reconciled to remaining; 88 per cent were reconciled to reunification³.

A recent report by Social Change Initiative and King’s College London (Values and Attitudes in Northern Ireland 25 Years after the Good Friday Agreement) concluded that there was “limited evidence of deep political polarization in NI”⁴. The vast majority of Northern Ireland’s voters are reconciled to living in a future that most of them would prefer not to happen.

Such findings pose a challenge to politicians who use ‘reconciliation’ in ways that don’t recognise these new realities. No reconciliation is possible between political narratives that justify and approve of republican or loyalist or state violence. No reconciliation is possible between tribal traditions that see nationalism and unionism as mutually exclusive and monolithic. However, it is people who reconcile, not ideologies. Most people are a complex weave of national-political, religious and geographic strands; reconciling these strands within oneself is an ongoing process for many Northerners. What tradition does a British Catholic from Cullybackey or an Irish Protestant from Rostrevor belong to?⁵

Unionist and Other voters — and many nationalists — don’t accept Sinn Féin’s narrative that justifies the IRA’s campaign of violence. Nationalist and Other voters — and many unionists — don’t accept the DUP’s anti-BGFA, anti-EU, anti-Irish language and pro-Protestant-monarchy narratives. The 2006 St. Andrews Agreement has turned the appointment of First and Deputy First Ministers into a tribal joyride between mutually irreconcilable communal party narratives. Is it any wonder that the recent Programme for Government document is a mere paper tiger?

While the Assembly election elects MLAs using PR-STV, the appointment of First and Deputy First Ministers is essentially based on first-past-the-post as regards the number of MLAs. The Assembly doesn’t even vote on who becomes First Minister or Deputy First Minister. Remember April 2021, when the majority (24 to 4) of DUP MLAs were opposed to Edwin Poots’ nomination of Paul Givan as First Minister?⁶ People deserve better.

How can the irreconcilable narratives of the two major parties be brought to convergence with the mostly reconciled electorate? We need reformed structures of power and governance that complicate party narratives. For example, suppose there was an election for FM and DFM, held two weeks after an Assembly election (as happens with the second round of voting for both French Presidency and Assemblée Nationale). Each party with MLAs could nominate one candidate, who would have to be an MLA. This PR-STV election would have two seats. However, there would be no quota. Rather, the candidate with the lowest vote would be excluded in each count – and their transfers distributed – until there were just two candidates left. The leading candidate would then become First Minister, and the second-placed candidate would become Deputy First Minister.

How would this election force moderation of party narratives? The likely top three candidates at present would be from Sinn Féin, the DUP and Alliance (in descending order of likely first preference vote). Thus, whoever would attract the most non-communal transfers would become First Minister. A 2023 LucidTalk poll showed that ‘Neither’ voters distrusted Sinn Féin and DUP more than other parties⁷. It would be difficult for candidates who support either the IRA’s campaign of violence or a sectarian monarchy or Brexit or creationism to gain Neither transfers. Whichever of these parties most complicates (i.e. moderates) its current narrative would become First Minister.

How might such an election turn out? The likely order of the six main parties, when only those candidates are left, is:

• Count 1: SF   DUP   Alliance   UUP   SDLP   TUV (eliminated after count 1)
• Count 2: DUP   SF   Alliance   UUP   SDLP
• Count 3: SF   DUP   Alliance   UUP
• Count 4: DUP   SF   Alliance
• Count 5: FM: ?    DFM: ?

The final — probably Alliance — distribution would decide who gets to be First Minister.
{Assumptions: I am assuming that Sinn Féin’s vote goes down somewhat, as some SDLP voters in 2022 may have voted tactically for Sinn Féin to ensure a nationalist First Minister. I also assume that TUV voters transfer to the DUP candidate in hope of an unionist FM. I am also assuming no other party puts up a candidate.}

The problem, for both Sinn Féin and the DUP, is that Alliance voters are none too enamoured of both parties. Typically, they by far prefer to transfer to the SDLP and then the UUP. Not only that, but they prefer not to transfer at all than transfer to Sinn Féin and the DUP. The table, below (for the 2022 Assembly election), shows Alliance transfers to the other five major parties in relation to the amount of non-transferable votes:

We see that, in 12 out of 13 transfers, more Alliance votes were non-transferable than went to either Sinn Féin or the DUP.

Both big parties would, naturally, oppose such a change to the FM-DFM appointment mechanism. However, I believe it would be popular with voters as (a) they get to directly decide on the two most important jobs in Northern Ireland politics; (b) it forces both big parties to moderate their zero-sum narratives if they want the top job. Sinn Féin and DUP strategists might actually welcome such a move as it frees them from the cul-de-sac of backwards-facing rhetoric.

The proposed change would also transform the border-poll debate for both reunificationist and pro-union campaigners. How? The major parties would have learned that complicating their narrative helps gain the First Ministership. So it would also be in a border poll. Non-communal voters will have the decisive role in determining whether reunification or remain happens.

The task for pro-union strategists before a border poll is how to sufficiently pluralise Northern Ireland (e.g. petition Westminster to repeal the sectarian nature of the monarchy; embrace the Irish language as much as Scottish and Welsh unionists do with Gàidhlig and Welsh, respectively) to attract unity-agnostic voters. The time to do that is now, well before a border poll. Changing the FM-DFM election mechanism would encourage agile thinking among pro-union strategists.

In the 2024 ARINS poll, 60 per cent of Northerners agreed that it is somewhat or extremely important to plan for the possibility of unity, well above the 34 per cent who supported reunification. Perhaps it is time all reunificationist parties reconciled themselves to the desire of voters to see detailed, coherent, pluralist and transformative reunification proposals that return Northern Ireland to the EU and put clear blue water between a new Ireland and a campaign of violence that did not succeed in achieving unity. They may be pleasantly surprised by the reaction of the non-polarized voting majority, who have learned, in Séamus Mallon’s words, how “to share this place”.

NOTES:

¹ Sam McBride, “‘My simple solution to NI was Brits out, 32-county Ireland’: Taoiseach on how his thinking has changed since first visit”, Belfast Telegraph, April 12th 2025.

² Presentation of 2024 ARINS survey results in Belfast, March 2025; Professor Brendan O’Leary, at 9:07 on this video (my figures for both Catholics and Protestants come from this slide on the video).

³ ARINS 2023 survey data: see pages/slides 20 and 22 of this pdf.

⁴ The SCI/KCL report can be found here.

⁵ The 2021 Census showed that 75% of Cullybackey Catholic residents, who described their national identity as either “Irish only” or “British only”, picked “British only” (the highest percentage for any settlement in NI). Some 34% of Rostrevor Protestants, who described their national identity as either “Irish only” or “British only”, picked “Irish only” (the highest percentage for any settlement in NI).

⁶ “DUP revolt over first minister confirmation”, BBC News, June 17th 2021.

⁷ Suzanne Breen, “Majority of middle ground say NI should remain as an integral part of the UK – poll”, Belfast Telegraph, March 3rd 2023.