Lord Ashcroft: Russia is losing its grip on its neighbours | Conservative Home

Lord Ashcroft KCMG PC is an international businessman, philanthropist, author and pollster. For more information on his work, visit lordashcroft.com. 

For most of a millennium, Russia has been the centre of gravity in its neighbourhood. Since the fragmentation of Kyivan Rus and the rise of the Novgorod Republic in the 12^th century, Russia has served as a titular nation for the tribes and ethnicities surrounding it – from the days of the Russian Empire, through the Soviet Union, to today’s Russian Federation.

Many former Soviet states struggled to escape from Moscow’s orbit, partly due to a lack of institutional capacity and partly because of sustained Russian interference aimed at weakening their sovereignty and undermining their agency on the international stage.

This began to shift following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Countries in the Eurasian region—once deferential to Russia’s perceived power – were stunned by the brazenness and brutality of Moscow’s aggression. In Central Asia and the South Caucasus, the prevailing mood was a mix of horror and reflection: if Russia could unleash such violence on Ukraine, once its closest cultural and political partner, then what might it do to others with long histories of Russian chauvinism and imperial contempt?

At the same time, these countries saw the shortcomings of the Russian military and, crucially, a long-overdue show of unity and resolve from the West – something sorely lacking during the 2014 Crimea annexation or the invasion of Georgia in 2008. Many in the region quietly held their breath, wondering if this marked the beginning of the end for Russian imperialism.

Azerbaijan was one the first ones to openly back Ukraine’s sovereignty. As a country with parts of its territory occupied by neighbouring Armenia – and with bitter experience of Russian “peacekeeping” in Nagorno-Karabakh – Azerbaijan had every reason to take a principled stance. In March 2022, President Ilham Aliyev declared: “Never ever agree to the occupation,” reflecting a clarity of purpose that has since underpinned Baku’s actions.

Since then, Azerbaijan has been consistent in its support for Ukraine. It delivered humanitarian aid and fuel during the harsh winter of 2022-2023, when Russia deliberately targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Kazakhstan, too, demonstrated solidarity: its diaspora in Ukraine launched the “Yurts of Invincibility” initiative – traditional Kazakh shelters set up across Ukraine offering warmth, electricity, and comfort during the blackouts.

In July this year, Azerbaijan began delivering Azeri-origin gas to Ukraine via the southern Trans-Balkan route. This is more than logistical support; it is a strategic shift. Ukraine’s gas needs – once largely met by Russia – are now being diversified, with help from a former Soviet neighbour. Ukraine’s own gas production industry has suffered from relentless Russian attacks and territorial occupation, making this energy partnership all the more vital.

This realignment signals something deeper than wartime assistance. It reflects a structural shift in the region: Russia is losing its grip, and the post-Soviet space is being redrawn by emerging middle powers.

The South Caucasus, historically a geopolitical crossroads, is being transformed by the Russo-Ukrainian and Israel-Iran war.  Azerbaijan’s ascendancy is supported not just by Russia’s waning influence but by robust backing from Turkey and Israel. Despite Iran being a home to a large Azerbaijani diaspora, Baku maintains strong ties with Tel Aviv and has considered joining the Abraham Accords. Its relationship with Ankara, rooted in deep cultural and religious ties, is only growing stronger. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan is courting the European Union, offering itself as a viable alternative to Russian gas through the Middle Corridor.

While the EU has rightly been cautious, given Azerbaijan’s poor record on human rights, the Ukraine gas deal may prove an inflection point – particularly if Ukraine succeeds in its EU accession bid.

Armenia, too, is seeking to reorient itself. Once heavily reliant on Russia, it is now looking to integrate into the Middle Corridor – a vital trade route linking China, Central Asia, and Europe, while bypassing Russia entirely. With Georgia – once a democracy pioneer in the region and darling of the West – drifting closer to Moscow, Yerevan is making a strategic pivot.

Yet none of this negates an uncomfortable truth: countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Armenia have been implicated in helping Russia circumvent Western sanctions. Azerbaijan, for instance, has been involved in refining and re-exporting Russian crude oil and gas through complex networks of intermediary ownership and legal loopholes. This led the UK to sanction Azerbaijan’s state shipping company and several related entities.

Nonetheless, recent events in Baku – including the storming of Russia’s state propaganda outlet Sputnik and the detention of suspected FSB agents – signal a significant recalibration. The relationship between an emergent regional power and its former imperial master is being irrevocably reshaped.

The biggest testament to this came on Friday with the signing of a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the White House. Both countries, long entrenched in the conflict, have agreed to normalise relations and open access to the United States’ involvement in the Middle Corridor – now in a typical Trump manner rebranded as ‘The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity. This could signify a new era for South Caucasus and help curb Russia’s ability to evade sanctions in what has until now been a ‘blind spot’ for the West.

Across the region, Russia’s ability to dominate its neighbours is visibly deteriorating. As geopolitical fragmentation deepens and a multipolar world emerges, Moscow’s influence wanes. With its failures in Ukraine and increasing dependence on China, Russia risks becoming just another middle power in the region – only this time, a declining one.