IOMed mechanism offers new approaches to resolving the South China Sea issue

On May 30, 2025, 33 countries, including China, signed the Convention on the Establishment of the International Organization for Mediation (hereinafter referred to as the “Convention”) in Hong Kong, China. This marked the official launch of the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed), which had been in preparation for more than two years. IOMed is the first international organization dedicated solely to mediating and resolving international disputes. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated, the establishment of IOMed “fills an institutional gap focused on mediation-based dispute resolution and provides an important rule-of-law public product for improving global governance.” 

Given that disputes between China and the Philippines over parts of the South China Sea have not been properly resolved in recent years, and tensions have occasionally escalated in the past two years, the likelihood of settling these issues through negotiations or legal means in the short term appears slim. If the two countries were to attempt to address certain South China Sea disputes through the newly established IOMed mechanism instead, it could represent a novel alternative approach. The feasibility of this method merits further exploration.

Conciliation: An evolving method for the peaceful settlement of international disputes 

Conciliation is one of the political methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes as stipulated in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter. It is also explicitly listed as a principal method for dispute settlement in several key international instruments, including the 1948 American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá), the 1957 European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and the 1982 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes.

According to the 1961 Resolution of the Institut de Droit International, conciliation is defined as “a method for the settlement of international disputes of any nature according to which a Commission set up by the Parties, either on a permanent basis or on an ad hoc basis to deal with a dispute, proceeds to the impartial examination of the dispute and attempts to define the terms of a settlement susceptible of being accepted by them, or of affording the Parties, with a view to its settlement, such aid as they may have requested.”

Traditionally, conciliation is considered a method positioned between mediation and arbitration or judicial settlement. Compared with mediation, conciliation places greater emphasis on the formalized procedures of a conciliation commission rather than relying on the personal initiative of a mediator. Compared with arbitration or judicial settlement, conciliation grants the parties greater procedural autonomy and flexibility, and its outcomes are generally more under the control of the disputing parties, usually lacking the binding force of arbitral or judicial decisions. 

In recent years, conciliation and mediation have increasingly converged. For example, the 2018 United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (the Singapore Mediation Convention) uses the term “mediation” to denote “conciliation.” Sun Jin, Director of the IOMed Preparatory Office, has also noted in his writings, “the terms conciliation and mediation can be used interchangeably, and both can be collectively referred to as conciliation.”

According to Article 2(a) of the Convention, “mediation” means a process, whether referred to by the term mediation, conciliation or other similar expressions, whereby the parties attempt to reach a mutually acceptable and amicable settlement of their dispute on a voluntary basis with the assistance of a third person or persons (the mediator) who may facilitate a solution between the parties to the dispute and lack the power to impose it upon the parties. 

From this definition, it is evident that conciliation under the Convention is an evolving, contemporary approach to international dispute resolution, based on conciliation while incorporating aspects of both conciliation and mediation.

The IOMed’s mechanism for mediating disputes between states and its characteristics

According to Chapter V of the Convention, the scope of cases accepted by the IOMed includes: disputes between States; disputes between a State and a national of another State; and international commercial disputes between private parties. In the case of inter-state disputes, the disputing parties’ autonomy is fully safeguarded throughout the entire mediation proceedings. 

First, Articles 24 and 25 of the Convention emphasize that the consent of the disputing parties is a prerequisite for initiating the mediation proceedings. Sun Jin, Director of the IOMed Preparatory Office, has pointed out that “the IOMed shall entertain only those disputes that the parties have unanimously agreed to submit.” Furthermore, Article 24(2) stipulates that “consent to mediation may be withdrawn by a party unilaterally at any time during the mediation proceedings,” thereby ensuring that no party is compelled to accept an outcome against its will as a result of unforeseen “deviations” in the mediation proceedings. 

Second, regarding the subject matter of disputes, Article 25(3) and Article 29 of the Convention grant the parties the right to exclude IOMed’s jurisdiction over certain types of disputes by issuing a declaration. For disputes involving a third State, Article 26 of the Convention explicitly provides that “the Organization shall not provide mediation services with respect to such dispute unless prior consent is given by the third State concerned,” fully safeguarding the interests of the third State and preventing it from being involuntarily drawn into the mediation. 

Finally, Article 38 of the Convention also clarifies the relationship between the mediation proceedings and other dispute settlement proceedings, emphasizing that “mediation may continue while other dispute settlement proceedings proceed, if the parties so agree.” This reflects the Convention’s respect for the parties’ autonomy in choosing procedural avenues. These provisions are also reflected in Article 4(b) on the “Principles of the Organization,” which stipulates that the Organization shall “ensure party autonomy and free choice of means in dispute settlement.” 

The IOMed mediation system also incorporates several “safeguards” for the parties, taking maximum account of their legitimate claims and interests.

For example, Article 33 of the Convention stipulates the confidentiality of all information relating to the mediation proceedings, and all documents generated in or obtained during the mediation proceedings. This helps insulate mediation from potential influence arising from domestic political pressures on the parties, thereby facilitating its smooth commencement and effective conduct. Article 34 further provides that, as a general rule, no party may invoke in other proceedings the positions taken by the other party or the mediation report, thus dispelling concerns that statements or positions expressed during mediation might later be used against them in arbitration or judicial proceedings. 

Unlike reconciliation reports produced in traditional mediation, which generally lack binding effect, settlement agreements resulting from IOMed mediation are, pursuant to Article 40(1) of the Convention, “binding upon all parties.” Given that the mediation process itself embodies party autonomy and the parties’ full control over the proceedings, and in light of the aforementioned “safeguards,” such agreements should reflect the parties’ genuine commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes. On this basis, their enforcement should not present difficulties. The conferral of binding force upon settlement agreements is precisely designed to reflect this rationale.

Attempts to address certain South China Sea disputes through the IOMed

The South China Sea disputes are widely regarded as highly sensitive and complex, as they involve historical claims, issues of territorial sovereignty, geopolitical considerations, national sentiment, and questions of international law. This very complexity is one of the reasons why approaches relying solely on negotiation or legal proceedings often prove insufficient to effectively resolve them. 

File photo: The China Coast Guard takes control measures against Philippine vessels that illegally entered waters near Ren’ai Jiao in the Nansha Islands. Photo/Visual China Group

Although the “South China Sea Arbitration”, unilaterally initiated by the Philippines in 2013, resulted in a so-called “final award” on July 12, 2016, China has consistently upheld its position of “non-participation, non-acceptance, non-recognition, and non-implementation.” Rather than effectively resolving the disputes between China and the Philippines in certain areas of the South China Sea, the arbitral award has instead become an impediment to easing tensions and advancing cooperation between the two sides. 

This situation bears some resemblance to the 1977 arbitral proceedings over the Beagle Channel between Argentina and Chile, in which Argentina refused to comply with the award, arguing that it was “insuperably null and void in accordance with international law.” At that time, the conflict was alleviated through active mediation by Pope John Paul II. Although the papal mediation did not immediately resolve the differences between the two countries, it played a constructive role in paving the way for the eventual signing of a peace and friendship treaty and the resolution of the dispute. 

Drawing on this example from international legal history, resolving the South China Sea disputes between China and the Philippines may call for an “alternative approach”—specifically, attempting to address the disputes through the mediation mechanism of the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed), an institution initiated by China. The feasibility of this new approach should be assessed from multiple perspectives, including its theoretical foundations and practical applicability. 

First, a prerequisite for applying IOMed’s mediation mechanism to the South China Sea disputes is that neither country rejects mediation as a peaceful means of resolving international disputes. More specifically, both states must be open to using IOMed as a platform for dispute settlement. 

China, as a primary initiator of the IOMed and the first signatory of the Convention, can reasonably be assumed to be open to employing the IOMed’s mediation mechanism for inter-state disputes. China has consistently maintained the principle of resolving disputes through negotiation, and Articles 25(3) and 29 of the Convention explicitly allow member states to opt out of applying mediation for “disputes concerning territorial sovereignty, maritime delimitation, and maritime interests.” To date, however, China has made no declarations indicating any intention to reserve the use of mediation for disputes involving territorial or maritime issues. 

In fact, the IOMed is not the so-called “Western-dominated dispute resolution mechanism of third-party involvement” that China has long been concerned about. On the contrary, of the 33 countries that have signed the Convention, all, except Serbia and Belarus, are from Asia, Africa, and Latin America—that is, developing countries. The Philippines is also a developing country. 

Moreover, regarding the mediation system itself, China regards it as a way of embodying the traditional cultural value of “harmony is most precious”. 

In his speech at the signing ceremony of the Convention on May 30, 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi cited the ancient Chinese anecdote of the “Six-Chi Alley” (1 Chi is about 32cm) to vividly illustrate China’s understanding of the spirit of mediation. Notably, the “Six-Chi Alley” story depicts neighborly mediation, where “each side yielded three chi and the dispute was ended,” symbolically enabling smoother and safer passage. This anecdote thus provides a solid theoretical and cultural foundation for China and the Philippines to peacefully resolve the ongoing disputes in the South China Sea.

File photo: Flags of China and the Philippines. Photo/Visual China Group

From a procedural perspective, although it remains unclear whether the Philippines is willing to join the IOMed, Article 25(2) of the Convention provides that the Organization may also provide mediation services for Non-Contracting States if they wish to submit their dispute to the Organization. In other words, even if the Philippines is not a member of the IOMed, the mediation process can fully proceed as long as it is willing to engage with China in resolving the South China Sea dispute through the Organization.

Furthermore, the inherently non-binding and non-adversarial nature of mediation, combined with the “safeguards” embedded in IOMed’s mediation mechanism, makes mediation a practically feasible option for both China and the Philippines to peacefully address existing disputes. 

Unlike arbitration, which involves formal hearings, cross-examination, and adversarial procedures, mediation proceedings remain essentially a diplomatic method, despite involving fact-finding and legal analysis. Its primary objective is to “seek a solution that is acceptable and amicable to all parties.” In the mediation proceedings, legal reasoning and evidence serve to facilitate a settlement, rather than to enable either party to “win” over the other.

Moreover, the confidentiality provisions of the mediation proceedings ensure that even highly sensitive issues concerning territorial sovereignty, maritime delimitation, and maritime rights and interests do not prevent the parties from “sitting down to negotiate.” This is fundamentally different from the South China Sea Arbitration, during which the Permanent Court of Arbitration occasionally published “hearing records” on its website. 

Finally, the provision that “consent to mediation may be withdrawn by a party unilaterally at any time during the mediation proceedings” ensures that mediation does not result in the kind of uncomfortable predicament sometimes seen in arbitration, where a party suffers an unexpected loss and is compelled to accept it. If a situation arises during mediation that either China or the Philippines finds unacceptable, either party has the right to suspend the proceedings. In practice, without the unanimous consent of both parties, no final settlement agreement can be concluded, thereby avoiding scenarios like the South China Sea Arbitration, in which one party demands enforcement of the award while the other firmly “refuses to comply.” 

Furthermore, regarding the applicability of the mediation system to the South China Sea disputes between China and the Philippines, it is clear that one cannot expect IOMed to “resolve all issues in a single stroke” or completely settle the long-standing disputes. Nevertheless, this does not preclude the possibility of the two countries submitting certain “smaller-scale” disputes for mediation, aiming to address individual “hotspot” issues one by one. 

For example, disputes over logistics and resupply at Ren’ai Jiao in the second half of 2024, as well as the environmental protection disputes that the Philippines threatened to leverage to initiate a “second arbitration,” could be considered. These disputes are not “core issues” like the legality of China’s South China Sea “nine-dash line” addressed in the previous arbitration, which could have far-reaching implications, nor do they directly involve territorial sovereignty over islands or maritime delimitation. Even if the two countries are ultimately unable to reach a settlement agreement on these smaller disputes, the potential loss would be minimal. 

Future prospects 

According to Article 60 of the Convention, this Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit of the third instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 

Chinese official media and scholars predict that IOMed will commence operations in early 2026. This means that there are still months before China and the Philippines have the opportunity to submit certain South China Sea disputes to the IOMed. During this “window period,” the two countries should actively use diplomatic channels to exchange views and explore the possibility of resolving specific disputes through IOMed’s mediation mechanism. 

If China and the Philippines both aim to ease tensions in the South China Sea and jointly foster a safe and orderly maritime order, attempting to utilize IOMed’s mediation mechanism would offer clear benefits without any drawbacks. The IOMed mechanism can serve as a “middle-ground” tool in the disputing parties’ toolkit, positioned between negotiation and legal approaches, and is certainly worthy of serious consideration as a means of peacefully resolving disputes between the two countries. 

The article is first published and authorized by the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative. The author, Bao Yinan, is an associate researcher at the Huayang Center for Maritime Studies and a visiting researcher at the Institute of International Rule of Law and National Security, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law. The opinions presented in this article are exclusively the author’s own and do not represent any official stance or viewpoint of Ecns.