A realignment of Pak.-Afghan relations

On October 11 and 12, there was an intense clash along the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan with substantial casualties on both sides. According to Islamabad, its forces killed more than 200 fighters on the Afghan side, while the Taliban has claimed the killing of 58 Pakistani soldiers. According to an official press release by the Pakistan Establishment (military), there were precision fires and strikes and physical raids targeting “Taliban camps and posts, terrorist training facilities and support networks operating from Afghan territory, including elements linked to Fitna al Khwarij (FAK), Fitna al Hindustan (FAH) and ISKP/ Daesh.” The Afghan military was quoted to have stated that the Afghan attacks were “in retaliation for the air strikes by Pakistani forces.” Taliban’s defence ministry went on to state that the operations ended at midnight of October 11 and “if the opposing side violates Afghanistan’s territory again, our armed forces are ready to defend their territory and will respond firmly.”

Following the clashes, Pakistan has closed the border crossings between the two countries.

For Pakistan, the clashes started on October 11, with “unprovoked” attacks from the Afghan side. For the Taliban, the border clashes were a response to an earlier attack by Pakistan on October 9, inside Afghanistan in the Kabul and Paktika province. While there have been minor skirmishes during recent years across the Durand Line, the latest attacks are the most important in recent Afghanistan-Pakistan history, and likely to be transformative in the Taliban-Pakistan military Establishment relationship.

Understanding the geography

The first set of attacks in the last week took place on October 9 in Kabul, the Afghan capital, and in the Paktika province. Kabul is just 230 km by road from Torkham at the western end of the Khyber Pass in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. As the crow flies, it should be less than 100 km if Pakistan has to conduct any aerial operations over Kabul. Of the five eastern Afghan provinces that share a border with two provinces of Pakistan, KP and Balochistan, Paktika shares the border with two tribal regions in KP — North and South Waziristan — the stronghold of the Mehsud and Wazir tribes.

The second set of attacks took place from October 11 to 12 along the Durand Line across the tribal regions — starting from Chitral in the north to Waziristan in the south. In return, Pakistan had targeted Afghan posts as well as training command and forts on the Afghan side.

Chequered history

After propping up the Taliban in the 1990s, and supporting it over the next two decades, why has Pakistan turned against them now?

The trigger for the recent clashes differ for both countries. Media reports have speculated that the target of Pakistan’s attack in Kabul could have been Noor Wali Mehsud, leader of the Pakistan Taliban. The two attacks on October 9 could also have been a warning to Afghanistan to not get close to India, for on that day, the Afghan foreign minister had landed in New Delhi for a week-long trip in India. Surprisingly, Pakistan’s DG-ISPR statement on October 12 also refers to the Afghan minister’s visit to India, but links it to Afghanistan’s “serious provocation,” and ignores its earlier October 9 attack in Kabul.

While the above two incidents were the trigger, the following five reasons could be identified as the underlying causes for the tensions between Pakistan’s Establishment and the Taliban. At the core of the conflict is how Pakistan and the Taliban perceive each other. Pakistan’s Establishment looks at the Taliban as its vassal. It expects the latter to be grateful for its creation in the 1990s, and the crucial political and military support it has received, both overtly and covertly, during the last three decades from Pakistan. On the other hand, the Taliban sees itself as independent, having weathered the previous two decades, especially Pakistan playing a double act during the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan during 2001-21.

Pakistan wants Kabul to be subservient to its strategic interests, while the Taliban seeks to chart a new beginning and pursue an independent policy, both within Afghanistan and outside.

Kabul had also initiated a dialogue with China. In August 2025, China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, visited Kabul and talked about investments in Afghanistan, especially in the mining sector. China has also started receiving official delegations from Afghanistan, including its Ambassador. In July 2025, Russia recognised the Taliban and accepted its Ambassador in Moscow. The Taliban wants to have its own external engagement while Islamabad expects its approval for the same. Pakistan’s attack in Kabul and Paktika last week, when the Afghan foreign minister was visiting India, is not a coincidence. Pakistan wants the Taliban to be dependent on it, from economy and trade to foreign policy. The recent New Delhi-Kabul rapprochement has not gone down well with the Establishment.

Secondly, Pakistan wants the Taliban to give up its support to the Tehrik-e-Taliban-Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan has been accusing the Taliban of providing a safe haven for the TTP, and also to Daesh and Indian proxies. The Taliban had developed close linkages with the TTP during the U.S. occupation. The Pakistani Taliban, especially the Mehsuds and Wazirs, had provided crucial support to the Taliban when Pakistan was playing a double game during 2001-21. So, it is possible that the Taliban still maintains connections with the TTP. However, Taliban disagrees with the Pakistan Establishment, and blames the latter’s militant problems squarely on Pakistan itself. For the Taliban, the Daesh militants are equally a threat.

Third, within Pakistan, the Establishment has either usurped external relations vis-à-vis the Taliban and Afghanistan, or the Parliament has abdicated its responsibility of the same. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, it has been the Establishment which has carried out Pakistan’s Afghan policy and not the Parliament. The latter has become a mere spectator, and even a supporter. The first thing that Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said after the latest clashes with Afghanistan was to praise the Army Chief for his resolve. The weak civil-military relations within Pakistan have been an important factor in Pakistan’s troubled relationship with all its neighbours, including Afghanistan.

Fourth, for the Taliban, the biggest issue is Islamabad’s unilateral decision to deport Afghan nationals from Pakistan. Since the 1980s, Pakistan has been hosting millions of Afghans who crossed the Durand Line in multiple waves. During the 1980s and 90s, Pakistan saw Afghan nationals as an asset, and as part of its strategic interests. Now, with the Taliban at the helm, Pakistan considers the Afghans within their territory as a liability. Since 2023, Pakistan has been unilaterally deporting, first, undocumented Afghan migrants (who came into Pakistan without any valid papers or registration), and later even registered Afghan refugees. The Taliban and the Afghans are against such unilateral deportation. Even international organisations, such as the UN Human Rights Council, have criticised Pakistan’s decision to deport Afghan migrants and refugees.

The fifth and final issue is the unilateral and repeated closure of border points by Pakistan in KP and Balochistan — especially at Torkham and Chaman. These two border points are not only the largest bilateral trade posts but also the primary entry and exit points for goods and people into Afghanistan. Though Afghanistan shares borders with Iran and Central Asia, historically, these two points have acted as global gateways for the movement of Afghans and of goods. Pakistan understands the strategic importance of these border points for Afghanistan; in recent years, it has repeatedly closed these two border posts, primarily as a pressure strategy against Kabul.

Pakistan sees the border points as a leverage, while Afghanistan sees them as their lifeline.

Readjusting relations

Pakistan, during the last few years, has been looking at the changing regional situation and pursuing actions to address it. Its recent rapprochement with Iran, its defence agreement with Saudi Arabia and the recent developments with the U.S. are part of this.

Similarly, the Taliban has also started to readjust to its regional environment. During recent years, it has been facing an assertive Iran, and like Islamabad, Tehran has also been deporting Afghan nationals. As mentioned above, the Taliban has opened a front with its immediate and extended neighbourhood — Moscow, Beijing and now New Delhi. Taliban needs these external engagements, not only for political reasons, but also to sustain its economy and rebuild Afghanistan.

Pakistan also has a serious internal problem in Balochistan and KP, for which the Establishment is blaming other nations, especially India.

If Pakistan sees Afghanistan as a vassal state, blaming Kabul (and India) for all its internal violence will worsen the relationship. The Establishment’s control of Pakistan’s Afghan policy will worsen an already bad situation.

D. Suba Chandran is Professor and Dean, School of Conflict and Security Studies, National Institute of Advanced Studies.