Political instability, constitutional change, and the military’s hold over Pakistan

On December 4, 2025, Pakistan witnessed something both familiar and unsettling. Field Marshal Asim Munir was formally appointed the country’s first Chief of Defence Force (CDF) while still serving as Chief of Army Staff (COAS). Recent constitutional amendments handed him extensive authority. Many analysts quietly described it as a silent coup, as no military on the streets, no dramatic announcements, just a slow tightening of control.

By late 2025, Pakistan had already experienced yet another shift in real power. The 27th Amendment ushered in legal immunity, curtailed judicial oversight, and centralised unprecedented authority in the hands of the military leadership.

Gen. Asim Munir’s rise did not happen overnight. After Operation Sindoor, where the public was told that Pakistan gained the upper hand against India, his stature grew. His meetings with world leaders, sometimes overshadowing the civilian Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, reinforced the impression that Pakistan’s elected government was no longer steering the ship.

The first coup

Pakistan’s early years were turbulent. After Partition in 1947, seven Prime Ministers came and went within just 11 years. Behind these political tremors lay a society divided along ethnic, linguistic, and regional lines.

One of the major factors behind political tension was language. The founding fathers made Urdu the national language, contemplating it to be a unifying force. However, Urdu was spoken by only 3-5% of the population. Bangla, on the other hand, was the mother tongue of more than 50%. In 1952, widespread protests erupted in Dhaka demanding the recognition of Bangla and protesting the systemic neglect of East Pakistan. This mobilisation on linguistic grounds gradually led to the rise of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman.

In 1958, a dramatic confrontation between Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon and President Iskander Mirza opened the door for the military’s entry into politics. Mirza dismissed the Prime Minister, imposed martial law, and appointed General Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator. Gen. Ayub had his own ambitions. Within weeks, he ousted Mirza, sent him abroad, and assumed control.

Gen. Ayub justified the takeover in his political autobiography, Friends not Masters. “From a soldier’s position. There would be large-scale disturbances across the country, and the civil authority, already groaning under the heels of politicians, would be incapable of dealing with the situation. It was the Army alone that could step into the breach.” Thus, by imposing martial law, Gen. Ayub thought he was shaping Pakistan’s destiny.

In 1959, Gen. Ayub declared himself Field Marshal without having won any war. It was Field Marshal Ayub Khan, who later planned Operation Gibraltar and Grand Slam in 1965. Operation Gibraltar was to invoke a local uprising in Kashmir, while Grand Slam aimed to capture Akhnoor, which, according to him, was the “jugular vein of India”. These plans failed. The war that followed left Pakistan shaken, and Gen. Ayub politically vulnerable and unpopular across the country.

From Ayub to Yahya Khan

As the 1960s drew to a close, Ayub’s rule became increasingly fragile. Economic inequality grew, protests erupted, and the once-popular military ruler found himself unwelcome on the streets. In 1969, exhausted and isolated, he handed power to another military chief, General Yahya Khan.

Gen. Yahya presided over Pakistan’s first general elections in 1970, a moment filled with promise. But when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won a majority in East Pakistan, while Zulfikar Ali Bhutto dominated the West, the military and the West Pakistani elite refused to accept the democratic outcome. What followed was brutal repression in East Pakistan, a mass uprising, and eventually the 1971 war with India that ultimately left Pakistan divided, with the emergence of Bangladesh. The defeat and surrender in Dhaka dealt a severe blow to Pakistan’s national psyche. Facing public anger and opposition within the army, Gen. Yahya stepped down in December 1971.

The Zia years

As Pakistan attempted to rebuild, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emerged as the political leader. But even Bhutto’s charisma and brilliance could not bridge Pakistan’s internal divides. His political style alienated various groups, especially Urdu-speaking citizens who felt marginalised. Moreover, the disputed 1977 elections plunged the country into chaos.

At this juncture, Army Chief General Zia-ul-Haq seized power under Operation Fair Play, ousted Bhutto, and later sent him to the gallows — a wound that still aches in Pakistan’s collective memory.

Gen. Zia ruled for 11 years. Always smiling in photographs, he combined discipline and ruthlessness. Under his regime, blasphemy laws were tightened, jihadist ideology took root, textbooks were rewritten, and opponents were crushed. Contrarily, Pakistan’s economic growth improved, but Ayesha Siddiqa, in Military Inc., calls it “rentier economic growth,” fuelled by foreign aid and the Afghan jihad rather than domestic strength. Smuggling networks, weapons trafficking, and informal markets flourished under Gen. Zia. It was also Gen. Zia who planned terrorism in Kashmir.

His death in a mysterious plane crash in 1988 ended an authoritarian era, but not the military’s hold over Pakistan’s destiny.

A General as Chief Executive

Benazir Bhutto won the 1988 elections, becoming the hope of a wounded nation. But the Army establishment soon clipped her wings, and her government fell within two years. The main reason was that Benazir was asserting herself and developing differences with the then Army chief Mirza Aslam Beg.

The 1990s saw a cycle of hope and disappointment. Governments fell one after another — Sharif, Benazir, Sharif again — as Pakistan struggled to define democracy. In 1999, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reached out to India. The image of Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s bus rolling into Lahore inspired many across South Asia. But while the leaders extended hands of peace, the Pakistani Army was planning something else. General Pervez Musharraf secretly launched Operation Koh-e-Paima (Kargil), hoping to seize strategic heights in Kashmir. This operation, carried out during India’s peace efforts, damaged Pakistan’s credibility and destroyed trust between Gen. Musharraf and Mr. Sharif. By October 1999, Gen. Musharraf overthrew the elected government.

Unlike past dictators, Gen. Musharraf presented himself as a reformer,promoting media openness, decentralisation, and “enlightened moderation.” But beneath the modern veneer, the military footprint remained strong. A series of crises, the suspension of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, the Lal Masjid siege, and Benazir’s tragic assassination eroded Gen. Musharraf’s support. His party collapsed in the 2008 elections, and he stepped aside.

From favourite to foe

Between 2008 and 2018, Pakistan saw four Prime Ministers — Yosuf Raza Gilani, Raja Pravez Ashraf, Nawaz Sharif, and Shahid Khaqan Abbasi — none completing a full term. The civilian–military tension remained a defining feature of governance.

In 2018, Imran Khan, once the Army’s favourite, rose to power with promises of reform and justice. Many in the Pakistani army believed he would be different. But like Bhutto and Mr. Nawaz, he eventually challenged the very institution that had helped elevate him. The moment he tried to assert autonomy, he faced resistance. Mr. Imran Khan became the first Pakistani Prime Minister to be removed through a no-confidence vote. Soon after, he was entangled in court cases, his party’s election symbol was stripped, and he was jailed.

Yet in the 2024 elections, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf-backed independents won more than 90 seats, a testament to his enduring popularity. Even so, a coalition led by Shehbaz Sharif, supported implicitly by the Army, formed the government.

Mr. Imran Khan remains popular but powerless, a reminder that in Pakistan, public support alone does not guarantee political survival.

Why the pattern persists

Since its birth, Pakistan’s civilian governments have struggled to control the state. The early loss of Jinnah, deep ethnic and linguistic divides, corruption, radicalisation, geopolitical entanglements, and the persistent weakness of civilian institutions have all allowed the military to emerge as the country’s most cohesive and powerful organisation.

The rise of Gen. Asim Munir is, therefore, not extraordinary. It is simply another chapter in the same story.

Until Pakistan rebuilds its political institutions, heals its internal divides, and strengthens civilian governance, the cycle will continue, and the military will remain the shadow behind every government — silent, steady, and always present.

Dhananjay Tripathi Teaches International Relations and Tabshir Shams is Pursuing his MA in International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi