Northern Ireland’s Political Crossroads: Problematics for the Three Blocs (Part Two)

Part two of Professor Peter Shirlow‘s survey analysis dives into the stark challenges facing Northern Ireland’s political blocs. Our data reveals zero growth in the pro-unity vote share since 1998, despite demographic shifts, and significant internal flux within pro-unionism.

Both major constitutional camps show an over-reliance on traditional voters and a lack of strategy to attract younger, policy-focused, and non-aligned electors. We explore the ‘problematic’ findings—from voter leakage to the constitutional commitment gap—shaping the path to 2027.

In this second piece we turn to the what the how would you vote tomorrow data and what it may mean for each bloc.

Pro-Unity Parties

We find no growth overall, as has been the case since 1998, in the pro-unity vote share. This is peculiar given the plurality of those joining the electorate since the mid-1990s have come from the traditional voter base of Catholics.

That does not mean that SF, SDLP and PBP could not grow as there are evident supporters for Irish unity who either do not vote or who vote non-constitutionally. But without gaining those voters it seems very unlikely, at this stage, that we will enter border poll territory in 2027. In overall terms when compared to how respondents voted in Westminster 2024.

• Sinn Fein’s vote is down but they maintain 96% of their Westminster 2024 vote. Their vote maintenance is impressive but there may be fewer new voters than was the case in previous elections.
• SDLP enjoy neither growth nor decline. It will maintain 81.1% of their Westminster 2024 vote but loses 4.5% to SF, 3.6% to Greens and 2.7% each to UUP, DUP, and Alliance.
• PBP who have grown would gain 7.1% from Alliance, 14.3% Greens and the rest evenly split between DUP, TUV and SDLP.

 Problematics: Pro-Unity Parties

• 1 in 5 pro-unity supporters who voted in 2024 do not vote for pro-unity parties. This finding continues a trend across University of Liverpool surveys.
• It is now 30 odd years since those joining the electorate were majority Protestant. Although a Catholic majority of new voters did not materialise there has been a notable plurality of electoral entrants from that community for nearly 3 decades.
• Pro-unity parties do not appear to have a plan to enhance electoral fortunes. There has been an over-reliance upon traditional voters and an expectation that a younger generation would follow traditional voting allegiances.
• Sense among younger and what would have been considered traditional pro-unity party voters that both SF and SDLP offer little regarding issues such as delayed adulthood, cost of living solutions, rents and house prices resolutions and a ‘fixation’ up the past such a legacy^[1].
• Perpetual cultural wars with unionism does not embolden electoral growth and among younger pro-unity voters is less motivating in terms of voting SF/SDLP than is the case for older voters.
• Those who are neither unionist nor nationalist find SF electorally unattractive.
• The failure to raise the share of the electorate in both Northern Ireland and the Republic who rank the constitutional issues as a priority.

 Pro-Union Parties

The pro-union parties are holding their recent vote share but there is more flux within compared to the pro-unity parties. The TUV continue to grow with modest growth for the UUP. The DUP’s attempts to stop the flow to the TUV has not been as effective as they would have hoped. In overall terms.

• DUP are down on their Westminster vote share and maintain 77% of that vote. There is significant leakage at 15.2% to TUV and 5.5% to UUP.
• UUP are up slightly and maintain 87.5% of their 2024 Westminster vote. They would potentially lose 8.1% to TUV and 1.5% to DUP, however leakage to Alliance seems to have stopped.
• TUV are up and maintain 100% of their Westminster vote with gains primarily coming from the DUP and to a lesser extent UUP.

Problematics Pro-Unity Parties

• As has been the case for several elections a significant share of pro-union voters, in this case 27.6%, vote beyond unionism. There seems to be no strategic vision to capture/re-capture these voters who tend to be a mix of socially deprived as well as educated, suburban, and socially liberal.
• It is commonly found among sections of the pro-union community that unionism is toxic and lacks a vocabulary for a new Northern Ireland.
• The 3-way split between the unionist parties can and will continue to affect outcomes in terms of seats won.
• Those who would vote to remain in the UK are less likely than those who would vote otherwise to know positive facts concerning what the Assembly has and does achieve.
• There is no unionist strategy to promote a more positive mood that would encourage a growth in voters, little to nothing regarding the case for the Union and no vision of a future for Northern Ireland.
• Younger pro-union voters find political party unionism detached from issues related to delayed adulthood, educational attainment and are seen as overly fixated upon traditional values and the past.
• The voting profile of pro-union voters is aging.
• The decline in seats held by unionists also reduces social capital, resources needed to fight elections and contact with the electorate.
• Those who are neither unionist nor nationalist find the DUP electorally unattractive.
• Internecine machinations over the Irish sea border, suspending the Assembly and perpetual cultural wars with SF does not embolden electoral growth.
• The failure to engage in the constitutional debate leaves many unionist voters feeling that unionism’s non-response permits pro-unity commentators to dominate the media narrative regarding constitutional change.

Non-Constitutional Parties

The rise of the non-constitutional parties since 1998 is noteworthy. In 1998 the Greens (0.9%) and Alliance (6.5%) shared 7.4% of the vote. By 2022 this had risen to 15.4%  (Greens (1.9%)) and Alliance (13.5%)). They are now predicted to rise to 17.7% largely due to the growth in support for the Greens. Overall.

• Alliance down slightly but maintain 83.2% of their Westminster vote – losing 1.8% each to TUV and SF, 6.6% to the Greens and 7.1% to PBP.
• Greens are up to 5.1% up but only maintain 68.4% from Westminster 2024. They are set to gain the following – 15.8% PBP, 6.6% Alliance and 2.6% each DUP and SDLP.
• The Green Party (NI) has gained a significant number of new members since Zack Polanski became leader of the party in England and Wales.

 Problematics non-constitutional

• Gaining electoral support West of the Bann and beyond the Belfast Urban Area.
• Having a voter base that includes significant numbers who are pro-union, pro-unity and agnostic regarding the constitutional issue. As these parties capture more pro-unity voters this could cause internal tensions within and lead to challenge by both pro-union and increasingly pro-unity parties.
• The Greens foray into an electoral pact with the SDLP affected their recent electoral fortunes and pushed away pro-union voters.
• Both parties have to be able to manage their diverse electoral bases and also develop their position and meaning of and for non-constitutional politics. Both need to spell out what non-constitutional politics means and what their vision is around jobs, housing and healthcare.