Airspace breaches by Russian drones highlight NATO’s lack of preparedness

Unauthorised drones have been spotted in at least 10 European countries in the last couple of months. On September 9, close to 19 Russian drones flew in Polish airspace. This prompted Polish and NATO forces to engage F-16 and F-35 jets to shoot down at least three drones. Soon after, Romanian airspace was violated by Russian Shahed 136 (Geran 2) drones that were detected by two F-16 jets monitoring Romanian borders. Romania didn’t shoot down any drones, but summoned the Russian ambassador to its capital, Bucharest.

Apart from these two confirmed Russian drone sightings, many other EU countries have noticed drone activities in which they suspect a Russian arm. In Denmark and Germany, drone sightings around multiple airports caused forced closures. In Germany, the Munich airport had to be temporarily shut down on October 4, during the peak of the Oktoberfest, leaving around 10,000 passengers stranded.

Speaking on public television, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said he suspected Russia of being behind the drone attacks in Germany and that the matter was under investigation.

Dr. Emil Archambault, fellow at the Centre for Security and Defense at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), noted that the recent drone sightings could have had two possible objectives: reconnaissance and information operation.

The reconnaissance operations could have been meant to test NATO defences and the technical information of radar systems deployed.

“The other objective could be an information operation to create fear and concern and lead to political debates in European countries, to withdraw support from Ukraine. We have seen Russia do this before with other means, such as cyber attacks. This can cause fear among the population, prompting political action,” said Mr. Archambault.

Mauro Gilli, professor of Military Strategy and Technology at the Berlin-based Hertie School, noted that it was likely such operations would continue in the future.

“We should look at them as part of a broad set of actions by Russia to impose costs on European countries. With these actions, Russia is trying to dissuade Europeans from further supporting Ukraine. This is the definition of coercion — you impose a cost on your adversary as long as it keeps doing something,” said Mr. Gilli.

Drone wall

In her ‘State of the Union’ speech on September 10, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen condemned the “reckless and unprecedented violation of Poland’s and Europe’s airspace.” She also announced a drone partnership with Ukraine and Europe, with a €6 billion loan to form the Drone Alliance for Europe.

Another oft-heard term that picked up speed in the aftermath of the drone sightings was “Drone Wall”.

The European Commission has proposed a drone wall along the frontline countries bordering Russia, commonly known as the Eastern Flank countries, to detect, track and intercept drones violating European airspace. This would be broadened into a “European Drone Defence Initiative” meant to protect the continent against drone attacks. The focus would be on developing anti-drone systems by startups and well-established defence players.

Mr. Archambault noted that along the Eastern Flank, there has to be a quick, coordinated response and would require several countries working together.

“There has to be a clear chain of command when it comes to drone sightings in the border countries. Inside the EU, there has to be information sharing at the NATO or EU level. Individual countries should secure their own airports, military establishments and so on, but also engage in information and best practices sharing with partners,” said Mr. Archambault.

Mr. Gilli noted that the idea behind the “drone wall” is the same as Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS), which is a network of ground-based, airborne and satellite-based sensors.

“The technology already exists, but the challenge is covering a long border from both low-altitude and high-altitude threats. This requires a lot of sensors and a lot of shooters — because each node in this network has range limitations,” said Mr. Gilli.

Countering drones with drones

In the recent instances of drone sightings, high-end fighter jets were deployed. But this isn’t a sustainable way of responding to drones, say experts.

“Using Patriot Missiles against a small drone is useless. Similarly, fighter jets flying at near-supersonic speeds are not the best to take down a drone flying at low speed. New solutions have to be cheaper and better at this, and also should be able to be deployed in large quantities. Just neutralising drones isn’t enough. One should also be able to locate the operators of these drones,” said Mr. Archambault.

Ukraine has been at the forefront of using drones in warfare, and makes over 90% of these battle-ready drones in-house. The drones spotted in Poland and Romania are the ones Ukraine is dealing with. Mr. Archambault notes that NATO can learn a great deal militarily from Ukraine about identifying different drone types and developing strategies to counter them.

Mr. Gilli noted that the drones that disrupted flights in Germany and Denmark were cheap, small and short-range, for which fighter jets would be unsuitable.

“The types of drones that violated Polish airspace are much larger and fly much longer ranges. For these drones, the answer is less clear: occasionally, jets can be used for these interceptions, but if the attacks are continuous, it can become demanding and inefficient,” said Mr. Gilli.

Munich-based Tytan Technologies is one such startup that is developing AI-powered drones to protect properties and infrastructure from drone or unmanned aerial vehicles. It recently announced plans to develop drone defence solutions to protect the German Army or Bundeswehr properties.

Max Enders, head of Business Development and Government Affairs at Tytan, told Reuters that just talking about the number of drones along the eastern border isn’t a solution; one has to think in layers of defence involving a sensory network, command and control software and different interceptors. He also stressed the need for a common standard.

“It really doesn’t make sense for Germany to protect its airspace if Poland, France, and the Baltic states use a different system. It’s about creating a European system that works, and that’s why interoperability is such a key factor. And one of the wishes or demands we have of politicians is that you need to create the framework, set protocol standards that allow every producer of effectors and sensors to work together,” said Mr. Enders.

Another aspect to consider in many European countries is who is responsible for neutralising or tracking drones?

Police vs Military

Germany’s Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt described the recent drone sightings in Germany and Europe as part of a hybrid threat, calling it an arms race between drone threats and drone defence.

In Germany, it wasn’t always clear who had the authority to take action against unauthorised drone sightings. The regional police or Landespolizei are responsible for dealing with drone threats, except at train stations and airports where the federal police or Bundespolizei takes over. The German military or Bundeswehr does not have the authority to shoot down drones inside Germany.

On October 8, Mr. Dobrindt released a draft law that authorises the federal police to “take state-of-the-art technical action against drone threats such as electromagnetic pulses, jamming, GPS interference”. He also said interception and shooting down drones will be regulated and possible for the federal police.

According to Mr. Archambault, the division of security work between the police and the military isn’t a new problem.

“But, we don’t want to be shooting down drones randomly. If a medium — or even small — sized drone is shot down and falls on a dense city, it can cause a lot of damage and can even harm someone. It should be a last resort. We need to make sure that there is capacity to detect intrusions,” said Mr. Archambault.

Mr Gilli noted that drones that disrupted flights were most likely operated from the vicinity and it is difficult to anticipate such moves. “They can only be neutralised after they have created problems. To do that, the technology is available — what Europe should consider is making sure that airports are well-equipped,” said Mr. Gilli.

Triggering Article 5

The military drone sightings in Poland and Romania have brought back speculations around what could trigger the collective defence clause or Article 5 of NATO. Under it, if a NATO member comes under attack, the other members of the alliance are obliged to help it respond. An attack against one NATO country is deemed an attack against all NATO countries.

“When it comes to the drones that violated the airspace of Poland and Romania, it is quite an escalatory move intended to threaten them, not even subtly, of future attacks. Potentially also on civilian infrastructure or civilians,” said Mr. Gilli.

On October 7, the European Parliament released a resolution which stated that the airspace breaches against NATO members “constitute a deliberate, systematic and ongoing threat to the security and resilience of the EU and its Member States.”

According to Mr. Archambault, NATO would need to be absolutely certain of the origin of drone attacks and if the attack was meant to induce deliberate violence.

“NATO has to also decide what scale of attack can trigger Article 5. Disruption or provocation must elicit a response, though that may be insufficient to trigger Article 5,” said Mr. Archambault.

(Nimish Sawant is an independent journalist based in Berlin)